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1. Introduction 
 The financial crisis in 2007/2008 leads to an active global debate on the rationale for implementing deposit 
insurance (DI) system by Central banks. Many Central banks introduced DI system in the wake of the financial crisis. 
For instance, Australia in response to the financial crisis, is among the last countries to implement an explicit deposit 
insurance system in October 2008. Demirguc-Kunt, A., Kane, E. J., & Laeven, L. (2015) provides a comprehensive 
global database of deposit insurance arrangements as of 2013. The basic contention for DI is that, during the financial 
crisis, increase in bank risk affects their repaying capacity to the depositors. Hence, DI not only reduces the burden on 
the Central bank but also hedges against such an increase in bank risk.  Academic researchers have raised concerns on 
DI system on the ground that any insurance mechanism will provide incentives for banks to take higher risk. Several 
researchers studied the role of DI on bank risk (see Kusairi, Sanusi, & Ismail, 2018; Chernykh & Cole, 2011;  Hadad, 
Agusman, Monroe, Gasbarro & Zumwalt, 2011; and Ioannidou & Penas, 2010). For instance, Chernykh & Cole (2011) 
report that after the introduction of DI system, moral hazard1, in the form of higher risk-taking by banks, has increased 
                                                 
1 In an agency framework, a moral hazard problem or sometimes referred as “hidden action” is an action of one party to a transaction (agent) that is 
unobservable by the second party (principal) who authorized the transaction (Kreps, 1990).  Krugman P. (2009) defines moral hazard as “the 
possibility that you will take less care to prevent an accident if you are insured against it”.   
Abstract: Central banks across the world implemented deposit insurance system as a major risk management 
practice in the post Global Financial Crisis (2007/2008) period. This study provides insights on the efficacy of 
deposit insurance policy in the Malaysian market where Islamic and conventional banking co-exist. Given that 
Islamic banking principles inherently limits bank risk taking ability, the study findings clearly identify the pertinent 
role of risk-based deposit insurance premium on mitigating potential increase bank risk in the post-financial crisis 
period. Using Malaysian banks data for the period 2002-2010, this study finds that Islamic banks have lower risk 
appetite than conventional banks. Most importantly, after the introduction of deposit insurance system, insolvency 
and operational risk increase mainly for conventional banks owing to inadequate premium. This calls for 
policymakers to carefully consider design features for an effective risk-based DI system that is risk-premium 
sensitive to ensure financial stability. Other policy implications include that the risk-based deposit insurance 
premium would prevent regulatory arbitrage, while Shariah compliance principles prevent the Islamic banks from 
adjusting their risk after the introduction of a deposit insurance system. Worth mentioning is the institution of an 
early warning mechanism policy as well as formal cooperation in information sharing protocols among policy 
makers, regulators and deposit insurance organisations to minimise operational risk in banks. 
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in Russia. However, it is hard to argue whether such an increase is caused by DI or other unobservable factors that 
might have led to an increase in bank risk. 
 This study extends the existing literature by providing new evidence in a country-specific study on how the shift 
from a flat rate to a risk-based DI premium policy would not necessarily be effective in mitigating the moral hazard 
problem when the risk-based premium is inadequate to cover for the increase in bank risk.  Although there is a 
significant amount of literature on the impact of DI on conventional banks, due to data limitations, this study provides 
fresh insights on the impact of DI system on the Islamic banks.  It might not be appropriate to apply the conclusions 
from conventional banks to interpret the impact of DI on the Islamic banks, although similar findings could occur.    
Secondly, exceptional from existing studies, in this study, the annual DI premium paid by the banks is estimated based 
on the deposit insurer methodology. This allows the investigation of the risk-based premium sensitivity and the 
magnitude of the annual premium paid.  Finally, the findings of this study suggest that further reforms are needed under 
the risk-based insurance premium system and call for banking supervisors and regulators from countries with flat-rate 
premium to carefully consider an effective design of the risk-based premium as optimal bank regulation so that the 
premium is positively correlated with the increase in risk and thereafter provides the incentives for banks to improve 
their risk management practices.   
 This study has three important findings to report. Firstly, the results suggest that DI does not lead to an increase in 
risk-taking by Islamic banks. In the case of conventional banks, the findings are consistent with most studies (see for 
example, Hadad, Agusman, Monroe, Gasbarro & Zumwalt, 2011; DeLong & Saunders, 2011; Chernykh & Cole, 2011; 
Ashraf, Zheng, Jiang & Qian, 2020).  The results provide strong evidence that conventional banks’ risk increased after 
the introduction of DI system. Secondly, contrary to Chernykh & Cole (2011) study, this study finds strong evidence 
that operational risk increases in conventional banks after the introduction of DI system. Although the operational risk 
is a traditional risk, the operational risk profile is becoming more complex attributed to the rapid changes in new 
business activities, new delivery channel and advancement in financial technology and financial innovation (Moosa, 
2007). Finally, the study provides new evidence in a country-specific study on how the policy shift from the flat-rate 
premium to risk-based premium does not necessarily mitigate the moral hazard problem.  Literature suggests that the 
risk-based premium method will mitigate the moral hazard problem (see for example Cull, Senbet & Sorge, 2005; 
Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2004; Hovakimian P. K., 2003; Demirguc-Kunt & Detragiache, 2002;).  However, none 
of the country-specific empirical studies in the DI literature (see Chernykh & Cole, 2011; Hadad et al., 2011; Ioannidou 
& Penas, 2010) has examined the sensitivity of DI premium towards bank risk in the risk-based premium method. This 
evidence is relevant as these countries (Russia, Indonesia and Bolivia) continue to adopt the flat rate insurance 
premium until today. Even though the risk-based DI premium in Malaysia is sensitive towards bank risk, the 
relationship is in the opposite direction indicating that risk-based premium is inadequate to cover increased bank risk.  
The results suggest that during the period under study, the current design of the risk-based DI premium policy in 
Malaysia is still not effective to mitigate the moral hazard problem.  
 This study uses Malaysian markets for analysis as Malaysia has both conventional banks and Islamic banks in the 
main stream banking system. Islamic banks have clear risk-taking principles that are invariant with market conditions. 
They have clear norms on the nature of assets that are considered as investments. Moreover, they are also compulsory 
DI member along with conventional banks. Interestingly, during the crisis, Islamic banking in Malaysia has grown its 
importance as an alternative to conventional banking that appears riskier than the Islamic banks (Abduh, Omar & 
Duasa, 2011). Apart from that, Islamic banks have significantly lower credit risk compared to conventional banks 
(Kabir et al., 2015).  On the contrary, Sorwar et al. (2016), using a sample of 65 Islamic and 65 conventional banks, 
find no difference in risk-taking between Islamic and non-Islamic banks. In Malaysia, total Islamic banking assets 
recorded a leapt of 80% increase from RM435 billion in 2011 to RM835.19 billion in 2019 (Bank Negara Malaysia, 
2011 & 2019).  
 The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, the study explains the institutional background 
and compares the Malaysian DI system with other countries.  Hypotheses development is described in Section 3.  
Section 4 discusses the data and methodology. Section 5 presents the results of this study.  Section 6 concludes with a 
few policy and literature implications.   
 
2. Institutional Background: Malaysian Banking System 
Table 1 reports the time series trend of banks in Malaysia. The Malaysia banking sector is rising in importance as a 
contributor to the Malaysian economic activity. Over the period 2002-2010, the number of banks has increased from 47 
to 55.  Banking represents an important economic activity as they represented around 300% of the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) of the economy.  Therefore, it is important to ensure the stability of the banking system.  The 
introduction of the DI system in September 2005 was among the measures undertaken by the government to 
accomplish this purpose as instability in the banking system could be chaotic for the entire economy. 
In Malaysia, DI system was initially proposed in 2001 as part of the Financial Sector Master Plan.  The Malaysian 
DI system is mandated by law and administered by Perbadanan Insurans Deposit Malaysia (PIDM), a statutory body 
established in 2005.  PIDM is also known internationally as Malaysia Deposit Insurer Corporation (MDIC).   MDIC 
complements Bank Negara Malaysia (which is the primary regulator and supervisor of the banking system) role by 





providing safety nets for depositors and insurance policyholders (members' bank) in promoting financial stability. 
MDIC was established under the Akta Perbadanan Insurans Deposit Malaysia on 1 September 2005 to administer the 
national explicit DI system. The DI protection limit then was RM60,000 (principal and interest or return). Consistent 
with measures taken by neighbouring countries, the Government Deposit Guarantee (GDG) was implemented as a 
temporary pre-emptive and precautionary measure to preserve confidence in the banking system and maintain financial 
stability. Under the GDG, all Ringgit and foreign currency deposits placed in commercial banks, Islamic banks, 
investment banks and international Islamic banks are protected under guarantee.  In addition, the five deposits-taking 
BNM licensed under the Development Financial Institution Act are also included in this GDG blanket guarantee.  The 
Government provided the GDC until 31 December 2010.  Thereafter, MDIC reverted to the previous coverage of an 
explicit DI system with an increased limit from RM60,000 to RM250,000 per depositor per member bank. In terms of 
its design features, membership for the DI is mandatory for all conventional banks licensed under the Banking and 
Financial Institutions Act and all Islamic banks licensed under the Islamic Banking Act, including foreign banks 
operating in Malaysia as provided under the MDIC Act. 
The distinct design features between other country-specific empirical studies like Russia, Indonesia and Bolivia are 
the annual premium assessment method.  Malaysia started with the flat rate premium in the first two years of the DI 
period before shifting to a risk-based premium in the year 2008 until today.   In contrast, these three countries continue 
to adopt a flat rate system. Under a risk-based premium, each member bank annual premium is calculated differently 
according to their risk categories. A member bank with high risk will fall under the high-risk category while the low-
risk bank will fall under the low-risk category.  The annual premium is derived based on the total insured deposits held 
by a member bank and the prescribed premium rate according to an individual bank risk category.  Malaysia introduced 
the risk-based premium amongst others to provide the incentives for banks to improve their risk management practices. 
Hence, this study also captures the cross-sectional variation in the deposit insurance premium. 
 




2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
No of banks 47 46 41 42 42 47 54 54 55 
Assets 735,189.59 815,989.87 872,354.70 958,545.73 1,092,914.42 1,221,429.07 1,337,978.23 1,426,206.38 1,549,779.27 
% of GDP 333.54 350.97 349.90 365.61 229.83 241.23 252.36 273.69 277.55 
Capital 63,195.22 69,794.36 72,484.62 75,203.44 84,952.06 94,381.50 111,603.51 131,969.37 144,428.57 
% of GDP 28.67 30.02 29.07 28.68 17.86 18.64 21.05 25.33 25.87 
% to asset 8.60 8.55 8.31 7.85 7.77 7.73 8.34 9.25 9.32 
Loans& 
Advances 451,488.44 472,984.17 511,782.07 555,494.78 587,863.72 639,768.39 723,454.01 782,020.71 880,414.44 
% of GDP 204.83 203.44 205.28 211.88 123.62 126.35 136.45 150.07 157.67 
% to assets 61.41 57.96 58.67 57.95 53.79 52.38 54.07 54.83 56.81 
Household 
Deposits 217,206.52 238,146.62 258,448.48 273,649.82 299,101.55 329,332.81 364,579.60 377,107.19 407,765.30 
% of GDP 98.54 102.43 103.66 104.38 62.90 65.04 68.77 72.37 73.03 
% to asset 29.54 29.18 29.63 28.55 27.37 26.96 27.25 26.44 26.31 
 
Source: Monthly Statistical Bulletin, Bank Negara Malaysia, selected issues (2002-2010) 
 
3. Hypotheses Development  
3.1 Deposit Insurance and Bank Risk 
Regulators argue that credible DI system promotes financial stability in the banking system (Gropp, Hakenes & 
Schnabel, 2011) and enhances depositor confidence from shifting deposits (bank runs) (Fecht, Thum & Weber, 2019) 
given that any disruption in a country’s bank can potentially create social cost outside the banking system. However, 
most empirical studies do not support regulators rationale for DI. Researchers find that an explicit DI has a negative 
impact which is likely to motivate banks to increase their risk-taking in the form of moral hazard.  These studies for 
example, include those by Ashraf, et al. (2020), DeLong & Saunders (2011), Hadad et al., (2011), Ioannidou & Penas 
(2010) and Baer & Brewer (1986).  Karels & McClatchey (1999) provide similar evidence in the credit union industry. 
On the contrary, Gropp & Vesala (2004) study show that the establishment of explicit DI may significantly reduce the 
risk-taking of banks.  They show that explicit DI in the European banking system has reduced banks’ risk-taking 
through a decrease in leverage risk.  They argue that the limited government commitment in the design of explicit DI 




may mitigate the moral hazard problem. Hence, their evidence points toward supporting the implementation of explicit 
DI as a risk deducing effect rather than implicit DI.  On the other hand, Forssbaeck (2011) study support the view that 
the presence of explicit DI reduces bank risk-taking by creditors policing role.  Hence, empirical results on the 
implication of DI system regulation are still inconclusive. 
 
3.2 Islamic Banking Principles  
With the importance of Islamic banking, it is overwhelming that the impact of DI on the Islamic banks has not 
been analysed as rigorously as the conventional banks. The Islamic banking system in the world either exists as a full-
fledged system like Sudan or a dual banking system that operates alongside the conventional banks like Malaysia. 
However, during the period under study, only 10 countries2 including Malaysia (International Association of Deposit 
Insurance, 2010) with an Islamic banking system have implemented an Islamic DI system.  This Islamic DI system or a 
Shariah-compliance deposit insurance system is an arrangement to protect insured depositors with the Islamic banks 
against the loss of their insured Islamic deposits in the event of the failure of an Islamic bank. Among these 10 
countries only Malaysia DI system managed the Islamic deposit insurance fund separately from the conventional 
deposit insurance fund and is invested in Shariah-compliant instruments in accordance with Shariah principles. In 
addition, both Islamic and conventional deposit insurance funds under the Malaysia DI system are administered solely 
by a government owned deposit insurer (MDIC) and regulated under specific legislation.  
The theoretical underpinning of Islamic banks’ differs from the conventional bank particularly in the prohibition of 
gharar (uncertainty) and compliance to the Shariah principles that constraints the incentives for Islamic banks being 
involved in risky business.  Moreover, Islamic banks are likely to be seen as a proponent of ethical banking that 
emphasis on trust and business partnership with their borrower (Ostergaard et al., 2015). The dedicated Shariah board 
overlooking the conformity of products and practices to the Islamic law furthers inculcate prudence culture in the 
Islamic banks. Nonetheless, Islamic banks are sometimes perceived to have higher operational risk exposures that 
include the non-compliance of Shariah principle risk. The Shariah non-compliance conduct by the bank management 
and staff may lead to declining profitability (Tiby, 2011) as income from the Shariah non-compliance must be removed 
from the bank’s profit in the form of zakat. 
 
3.3 The Role of Premium Estimation Method 
This study argues that Islamic banks' behaviour towards risk may also vary from conventional banks, particularly 
with the existence of explicit DI protection.  Consequently, it may not be appropriate to simply apply the conclusions 
from conventional banks to interpret the impact on the Islamic banks, although similar findings can occur. DI premium 
is mainly estimated using either flat or risk-based premium prescribed by the regulator. With the flat-rate insurance 
premium, all member banks paid comparable insurance premium amount notwithstanding their risk portfolio.  On the 
contrary, risk-based insurance premium incorporates the risk of each bank assets into the premium structure. Thus, the 
insurance premiums that each bank pays will depend on its portfolio of risk.  Here it is expected that the risk-based 
premium system is sensitive with bank risk to mitigate the banks’ increased risk-taking after the introduction of DI 
system.  This is because under a risk-based premium if banks increase their risk, they will be penalised with a higher 
premium. In a different twist, in circumstances where banks have incentives to increase their risk-taking, the premium 
acts as a penalty for the increased risk as the riskier a bank is, the higher the premium paid.  It is believed that this 
relationship will eventually motivate banks to improve their risk management practices. Based on the above discussion, 
this study frames the following four main testable hypotheses: 
H1: Bank risks (credit risk, insolvency risk and operational risk) increase in Malaysian banks after the 
implementation of a DI system. 
H2:  Islamic banks do not exhibit any significant increase in risk-taking that is attributable to deposit insurance        
system. 
H3: The risk-premium sensitivity significantly improves in the risk-based premium assessment method. 
H4: The magnitude of the annual premium paid is positively correlated with bank risk. 
 
4. Data and Methodology 
4.1 Data and Sample 
 Malaysia is selected as the sample for this study for several reasons.  According to a survey done by the 
International Association of Deposit Insurance (2010), there are currently nine countries namely Malaysia, Indonesia, 
Singapore, Turkey, United Kingdom, Bahrain, Jordan, Bosnia and Kuwait that practice dual banking system as well as 
conventional and Islamic DI system.  Amongst these countries, during the study period, only Malaysia has an Islamic 
DI system that exists concurrently but is administered separately.  In contrast, the other eight countries operate the 
                                                 
2 Bahrain, Bosnia, Indonesia, Jordan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Singapore, Sudan, Turkey and United Kingdom. 





Islamic DI together with the conventional fund while the Malaysian model manages their Islamic DI fund in 
accordance with Shariah principles that is separated from the conventional DI fund.  Moreover, the Malaysian Islamic 
financial sector is the most advanced among the countries that have a dual banking system and ranks higher in terms of 
Islamic banking assets.  An important reform on the DI premium has also taken place in Malaysia where the risk-based 
premium replaced the flat-rate premium.  Therefore, this allows this study to investigate the efficacy of DI policy in 
reducing bank risk in Malaysian market where Islamic and conventional banking co-exist. Hence, the selection of 
Malaysia as a sample for this study is justified. 
 Further, among the studies examining bank-level data, none had investigated the impact of DI on Islamic banks. 
Although Indonesia also operates a dual banking system, the study by Hadad et al. (2011) excludes Islamic banks. 
More than 30 years ago, Malaysia was among the pioneers to develop an Islamic banking system with compatible 
Islamic principles that operate alongside the conventional system.  The DI system in Malaysia covers both the 
conventional and Islamic banks with the DI fund being administered separately. Given this unique feature in Malaysia, 
a study using Malaysia as a country-specific sample for developing countries could not only provide in-depth analysis 
as opposed to the broad comparative cross-country studies but also compare and contrast the impact of DI on the 
conventional as well as Islamic banks. This unique difference for Malaysia appears to justify the expected different 
findings in the Malaysian context and adds to the Islamic banking literature.   
 Bank-level data are retrieved from BankScope database, developed by Bureau Van Dijk to construct a sample of an 
annual, balance and unbalanced panel from 2002 to 2010 of the Malaysian banks.  However, the data was crossed 
verified from annual reports published by the banks.  For the conventional bank balance sheet information, data for the 
period 2002-2010 are obtained exclusively from BankScope.  However, for the Islamic bank, both the annual report 
and BankScope are used to gather the data due to limited data availability in the BankScope.  Most of the Islamic banks 
in Malaysia became stand-alone subsidiaries after 2005 and 2008, apart from the two local stand-alone Islamic banks 
namely Bank Islam Malaysia Bhd and Bank Muamalat Berhad.  Prior to that, these Islamic banks operated under the 
Islamic banking window of the conventional banks and their balance sheet information was reported in the notes to the 
balance sheet of the conventional banks. 
 The yearly data of 22 conventional banks and 18 Islamic banks were obtained which covers all the mandatory 
member banks under the DI system from 2002 to 2010.  Hence, the sample consists of 9 years and covers before and 
after the period of DI system implementation. The panel is balanced for the conventional banks but is unbalanced for 
the Islamic banks due to the emergence of foreign Islamic bank after the year 2005. Overall, the panel is unbalanced for 
the full sample.  This unbalance sample will lessen the self-selection bias of the banks in the study sample. 
Conventional banks are those licensed under the Banking and Financial Institutions Act (BAFIA) 1989, while the 
Islamic banks are those licensed under the Islamic banking Act 1983.  To maintain the homogenous set of samples, 
only the mandatory members of the DI that is the banks licensed under BAFIA 1989 and the Islamic Banking Act 1983 
were included.  The investment banks and five deposit-taking institutions (both are not mandatory members) were 
excluded to reflect only the mandated members of the DI protection system.  
 The annual premium paid by the banks was estimated by the author based on MDIC methodology as it allows for 
the computation of the premium paid by conventional banks and Islamic banks. In determining the selection of data to 
estimate the annual premium, experts from MDIC were consulted.  These experts verified that the annual premium 
estimated is relatively consistent with the actual figures. 
 Detailed formula is described in the MDIC guideline3 accessible from MDIC website. Malaysia started with the 
flat-rate premium of 0.06% in the first two years of the DI period before shifting to a risk-based premium in the year 
2008 until today. Under the risk-based premium method, each member bank annual premium is calculated differently 
according to their individual risk categories. Member banks with high risk will fall under the high-risk category while 
lower-risk banks will fall under the low-risk category. However, the annual insurance premium is not priced to risk like 
the insurance industry but it is calculated based on the risk category that depends on the risk profile of individual banks  
 
4.2 Dynamic Panel Data Methodology 
 This study uses a dynamic panel data methodology because it captures the dynamic nature of bank risk taking that 
varies over time and the time-invariant variables like the dual banking system (conventional and Islamic banks) and 
ownership are important to be included and appropriate for the study model than a static panel that estimates using 
either fixed effect and/or the random effect models.  Further, the random effect model can allow the estimation of time-
invariant bank characteristic, however, at the cost of error term correlated with the variables in the model (Greene, 
2012). As suggested by Baltagi (2005), this study uses dynamic panel and instrumental variables (that is the lagged 
explanatory variables) to address the correlation problem between the variables and error term. Specifically, the study 
                                                 
3 The banks’ annual premium is estimated based on the Guidelines on Total Insured Deposits with maximum deposit coverage of RM60,000, 
Guidelines on the Differential Premium System and Guidelines for Deposit Insurance Coverage for Deposits issued by Malaysian Deposit Insurance 
Corporation. 




follows the System Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator of Arellano & Bover (1995) and Blundell & 
Bond (1998) to better estimate the dynamic relationship between bank risk and DI system. More particularly, the two-
step system GMM is applied to attain perfect estimators whereby one equation is indifference and the other is in levels.  
The two-step system GMM is ideal in this study where the number of period is small and cross-sections is large; 
dependant variable is persistent (dynamic); explanatory variables are not exogenous (they may correlate with error 
term); there are heteroscedasticity; and time-invariant individual fixed effect as well as autocorrelation within 
individuals, which are more common in bank-level data.  With regards to time-invariant variables, the system 
eliminates the effect of time-invariant variables but estimates in first difference.  Hence, it adjusts the biases of the 
time-invariant estimates while the moment condition ensures no correlation between the unobservable effect / time-
invariant effect/instrument variables. All in all, the System GMM estimation is appropriate for this study as the method 
works by combining the set of moment conditions for the first difference equation and level equation and run the 
regression simultaneously. 
 The post-estimation test (Wald test, Sargan test and Arellano-Bond) is done to ensure that the GMM estimator is 
appropriate for this study.  Wald statistic test is used to ensure the goodness of fit for all the regressions in the System 
GMM models while Sargan test specifies that the instruments introduced in the model is acceptable. The Arellano-
Bond tests such as AR(1) and AR(2)4 indicate that the estimates are consistent as there is no second-order serial 
correlation. 
 
4.3 Dependent and Explanatory Variables  
 In the literature, the commonly used risk measure is the accounting-based measures of risk (accounting ratios).  
Previous studies indicate that the accounting-based risk measures explain a substantial portion of the market-based risk 
(see for example, Agusman, Monroe, Gasbarro & Zumwalt, 2008).  This amongst others includes non-performing 
loans, z-score (Hadad et al., 2011) and the credit quality of bank loans (Ioannidou & Penas, 2010). Given that there is 
only one listed Islamic bank in our sample, the market measures of risk are not considered in our study.  Following 
previous studies related to bank risks, this study uses credit risk; NPLASSET (the ratio of non-performing 
loan/financing over bank assets), insolvency risk; ZSCORE and operational risk in the form of OVERHEADTA (the 
ratio of overhead expenses to bank assets). 
 Consistent with Ioannidou & Penas (2010) and Chernykh & Cole (2011), the study uses a DI period dummy 
variable (POSTDI) as the key explanatory variable. The dummy variable takes value one if a given observation falls 
from 2002-2005 (before the introduction of DI system) and zero otherwise (2006-2010 ie. after the introduction of DI 
system). This study also uses two other explanatory variables which are the estimated banks’ annual premium 
(PREMIUM) and an interaction term PREMIUM*RISKBASED.  The RISKBASED is a dummy variable that takes the 
value one if the premium system is a risk-based premium (over the period 2008-2010) and zero if the premium system 
is a flat-rate premium (over the period 2006-2007). The author estimates the annual premium paid by the banks; 
PREMIUM to examine whether the magnitude of the annual premium paid is positively correlated with the banks’ risk. 
Consistent with the moral hazard argument, a negative sign is expected for ZSCORE and a positive sign for 
NPLASSET and OVERHEADTA. The risk-premium sensitivity in the risk-based DI system 
(PREMIUM*RISKBASED) is expected to significantly improve and the magnitude of the annual premium paid 
(PREMIUM) is expected to be positively correlated with bank risk. 
 This study includes control variables for bank size (LOG_ASSET), ownership (FOREIGN-foreign versus local 
banks), risk variables (NPLTA/OVERHEADTA) and regulatory pressure, i.e., risk-weighted capital ratio (RWCR) that 
are commonly used in the literature.  The inclusion of the risk variables NPLTA and OVERHEADTA are to control for 
bank risk taking behaviour.  The study also controls the credit risk measure (NPLTA) as one of the control variables to 
redress the impact of DI on operational risk, while OVERHEADTA is controlled in the estimates for credit risk and 
insolvency risk (financial risk).  Regulatory pressure (RWCR) on bank’s capital is the primary cushion against adverse 
changes in the bank’s asset quality and earnings. In order to control for the sensitivity of size on the estimated insurance 
premium, the study interacted the DI annual premium with bank size.  There is no specific sign is expected for the 
control variables. Similar to Chernykh & Cole (2011), this study uses year dummy variables to control for general 
macroeconomics condition such as inflation, household income, economic growth etc. and seasonality effects apart 
from the presence of explicit DI system.  As there are nine years in the sample period, the research will have eight-time 
dummies.  
 
4.4 Empirical Models 
 Following the work of Chernykh & Cole (2011) as discussed in the earlier sections, this study tests the following 
general model, allowing for the aforementioned theoretical consideration: 
                                                 
4 AR(1) and AR(2) test the presence of autocorrelation at first and second difference. 





 Bank Riski,t(Full) = γRisk it-1 + β0 + β1POSTDIi,t + βjCONTROLi,t +  errori,t      (1)        
Bank Riski,t(PostDI)= γRisk it-1 + β0 + β1PREMIUMi,t + β2RISKBASEDi,t + β3PREMIUM*RISKBASEDi,t + 
βjCONTROLi,t + errori,t   (2)  
 
 This study runs three separate sets of regression for the two above models using three measurements for bank risk, 
namely credit risk (NPLTA), insolvency risk (ZSCORE) and operational risk (OVERHEADTA). Credit risk, 
insolvency risk and operational risk are present in the banks when the POSTDI shows a negative sign ZSCORE and a 
positive sign for NPLTA and OVERHEADTA. The NPLTA is controlled when estimating for operational risk.  
 On the other hand, the risk-based premium (PREMIUM and PREMIUM*RISKBASED) shall act as a deterrent for 
higher risk-taking if the coefficients are significant and positively correlated with bank risk.  
 
5. Result 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics  
 Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics.  This study sample consists of 345 bank years of observation. In a dual 
banking system, the majority of the sample is from the conventional banks (57%) while the remaining is the Islamic 
banks (43%).  By ownership, 51% are local banks, and 49% are foreign banks. The foreign-owned banks are the 
majority (60%) observation in the conventional banks while local Islamic banks (60%) are the majority in the Islamic 
bank observations.   
Table 2 - Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variables N (bank years) Mean Median Std. dev  Min 
Panel A: Full Sample      
NPLASSET 343 3.05 1.92 3.54 0 
ZSCORE 345 29.99 19.58 30.75 -26.14 
OVERHEADTA 345 1.28 1.24 1.67 0.03 
POSTDI (Dummy) 345 - 1 - 0 
PREMIUM (RM 
million) 
200 2.42 0.46 4.24 0.25 
RISKBASED 
(Dummy) 
200 - 1  0 
SIZE (RM million) 345 26.943.77 9369.6 42833.29 93.06 
RWCR 345 24.61 14.44 29.36 -2.84 
FOREIGN 345 - 0 - 0 
      
Panel B: Conventional versus Islamic banks    
Conventional banks      
NPLASSET 196 3.49 2.34 3.85 0.006 
ZSCORE 198 37.82 23.67 34.80 -26.14 
OVERHEADTA 198 1.32 1.32 0.45 0.22 
POSTDI (Dummy) 198 - 1 - 0 
PREMIUM(RM 
million) 
110 3.82 2.10 5.23 0.25 
RISKBASED 
(Dummy) 
110 - 1 - 0 
SIZE(RM million) 198 41082.41 27664.95 50368.57 516.5 
RWCR 198 25.74 14.35 28.82 9.16 
FOREIGN 198 - 1 - 0 
      
Islamic banks      
NPLASSET 147 2.47 1.18 3.01 0 
ZSCORE 147 19.44 16.12 19.97 -15.46 




OVERHEADTA 147 1.24 0.91 2.51 0.03 
POSTDI(Dummy) 147 - 1 - 0 
PREMIUM(RM 
million) 
90 0.70 0.27 1.09 0.25 
RISKBASED 
(Dummy) 
90 - 1 - 0 
SIZE(RM billion) 147 7899.90 5373.31 7993.16 93.06 
RWCR 147 22.93 14.5 30.06 -2.84 
FOREIGN(Dummy) 147 - 0 - 0 
  
This table presents summary statistics of the raw variables included in this study.  The study uses annual 
observations of Malaysian conventional and Islamic banks over the period 2002-2010.  The dependant variables 
include: NPLASSET is the ratio of non-performing loans to bank asset, a proxy for credit risk; ZSCORE is a proxy for 
insolvency risk; and OVERHEADTA is the ratio of overhead expenses to bank assets, a proxy for operational risk. The 
independant variable include POSTDI a dummy variable that is equal to one after the introduction of deposit insurance 
(2006-2010) and zero otherwise; and PREMIUM is the premium amount paid by banks for the deposit insurance 
coverage. SIZE, RWCR (risk-weighted capital ratio) and FOREIGN (1=foreign banks; 0=local banks) are controlled 
for.  
 In the full sample, the dependant variables; NLPASSET, ZSCORE and OVERHEADTA have a mean of 3.05%, 
447.63% and 1.28% respectively. It appears that there is not much difference in the dependant variables between the 
Islamic and the conventional banks.  In general, the RWCR of Malaysian banks are on average, 24.61%. This is 
significantly more than the minimum requirement of 8% (Basel II) and 10.5% (Basel III). The RWCR indicates that 
Malaysian banks have sufficient capital buffer. The median bank has RM9.37 billion of total assets.  An average 
Islamic bank is relatively smaller (RM7.89 billion) than an average conventional bank (RM41.08 billion).   
 Malaysian banks, on average, paid an annual premium of RM3.82 million with a median of RM0.46 million.  This 
amount is minimal, which accounted for approximately less than 1% of the banks’ profit. The minimum annual 
premium paid by the conventional banks and Islamic banks is RM0.25 million as required by the MDIC Act.  The 
MDIC’s experts confirmed that the DI premium estimated by the author is relatively consistent with the actual figures. 
The risk-based premium system is implemented in 2008 until today. Under a risk-based premium, each member bank 
annual premium is calculated differently according to their risk categories. However, the banks are subject to a 
minimum annual risk premium of RM0.25 million. The annual premium median for Islamic banks is RM0.27 million 
while the median for conventional banks is RM2.1 million. 
 
5.2 Correlation Structure 
 The Pearson correlation coefficient is reported in Table 3. Although the correlation coefficients are low but some 
of the correlations are statistically significant. There is a strong and very significant correlation (70%) between 
PREMIUM and SIZE. To ensure that there is no multicollinearity problem in the data, this study performs the variance 
inflation test (VIF). The VIF test suggests that there is no multicollinearity problem as the VIFs of the regression are 
below 10.   
 
5.3 Regression Results 
This study employs the System GMM estimator to test the four hypotheses using the two general models as 
described in Section 4.4. The author prefers System GMM against difference GMM mainly due to limited number of 
observations. Difference GMM significantly reduces the time-series observations. All regressions in these models 
satisfy the requirement of the System GMM. The post-estimation test conducted to check the appropriateness of the 
model is the Wald, Sargan and Arellano-Bond tests. From the post-estimation test reported for each regression, the 
System GMM is significant (Wald test) and consistent as there is no second-order serial correlation and the instruments 
introduced in the model is acceptable (Sargan test). 
 
Table 3 - Correlation Matrix 
 
 A B C D E F G H I J 
NPLASSET (A) 1          
ZSCORE (B) -0.001 1         





OVERHEADTA (C) 0.036 -0.077 1        
POSTDI (D)  -0.337*** -0.007 0.085 1       
FOREIGN (E) -0.363*** 0.011 0.055 0.0238 1      
BANKINGSYSTEM 
(F) 
0.1421*** 0.056 0.025 -0.058 0.234 1     
RWCR (G) -0.179*** -0.006 0.299*** -0.058 0.335*** 0.047 1    






1   
RISKBASED (I) -0.1580** -0.164** -0.056 - -0.000 0.000 -0.143** 0.106 1  






0.708*** 0.033 1 
 
This table presents the correlations between the variables included in this study. The study uses annual 
observations of Malaysian conventional and Islamic banks over the period 2002-2010.  The dependant variable is 
NPLASSET; a proxy for credit risk (the ratio of non-performing loan/financing to bank assets), ZSCORE; a proxy for 
insolvency risk is calculated by the author following Boyd et al.(2006) but with two years moving windows and 
OVERHEADTA; a proxy for operational risk(the ratio of overhead to total assets).  The independant variables dummy 
variables are POSTDI (1=PostDI and 0=otherwise), RISKBASED (1=risk based premium and 0=flat rate premium) 
and PREMIUM which is calculated with modification by the author based on the MDIC Guidelines.  The rest of the 
variables (FOREIGN, RWCR, SIZE, BANKINGSYSTEM) are controlled for in the model. 
 
5.3.1 What Can We Learn on Bank Risk After the Implementation of Deposit Insurance? (Hypothesis 1) 
 
Table 4 reports the regression results that examine bank risk-taking for all banks after the implementation of a DI 
system in dual banking with both Islamic and conventional banks. From the result, it can be seen that credit risk 
decreases while insolvency risk and operational risk increase after the introduction of DI system in a dual banking 
system. This result suggests that banks increase their risk through insolvency risk and operational risk after the 
introduction of DI as shown by the negative and significant sign of ZSCORE and the positive and significant sign of 
OVERHEADTA.  Hence, in a dual banking system like Malaysia, the banks are also subjected to the moral hazard 
problem by increasing risk as the DI system alters the willingness for the banks to assume greater risk.  The results 
support Hypothesis 1.   
 






Dependant variable (Expected sign with POSTDI) 
NPLASSET (+) ZSCORE (-) 
OVERHEADTA 
(+) 

































































































N 303 305 304 
 
This table presents the results from the two-step System Generalized Method of Moments estimations using 
STATA. The coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses). The Wald, Sargan and Arellano-Bond tests are the post-
estimation test to check the appropriateness of the model (in parentheses is the p-value).  From this table, the System 
GMM is significant (Wald test) and consistent as there is no second order serial correlation and the instruments 
introduced in the model is acceptable (Sargan test).  The estimation uses unbalanced annual panel observations of 
conventional banks and Islamic banks in Malaysia over the period 2002-2010.  The dependant variable is NPLASSET 
(the ratio of non-performing loan/financing to bank assets), ZSCORE calculated by the author following Boyd et 
al.(2006) but with two years moving windows and OVERHEADTA(the ratio of overhead to total assets).  The 
independant variable is the dummy variable POSTDI(1=PostDI and 0=otherwise). The rest of the variables are 
controlled for in the model. *, **and *** indicates significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
5.3.2 What Can We Learn on Bank Risk of Islamic vis a vis Conventional Bank? (Hypothesis 2)   
 
The BANKING SYSTEM variable suggests that there is a significant difference in the bank risk for the 
conventional and Islamic banks as both of the coefficients for ZSCORE and OVERHEADTA are significant.      
The study runs a separate regression to compare the bank risk after the introduction of DI for the conventional and 
Islamic banks.  The primary variable of interest is still the POSTDI.  If the conventional banks or the Islamic banks 
increase their bank risk through insolvency risk and operational risk, a negative and positive sign is expected for 
ZSCORE and OVERHEADTA, respectively. As the sample split into two (conventional and Islamic banks), this study 
runs separate regressions for the Islamic and conventional banks to explore the impact of DI on bank risks for the 
conventional banks and Islamic banks. 
The results, as shown in Table 5, indicates that there is a significant bank risk increase through insolvency risk and 
operational risk in the conventional banks after the introduction of DI system. Again, the result is consistent with the 
moral hazard hypothesis that banks have the incentives to increase their risk as they know that the insurance protection 
will provide a buffer for the downside risk. This study provides strong evidence that operational risk increases in 
conventional banks after the introduction of DI.  Interestingly, this is not the case for Islamic banks.  Table 6 suggests 
that the moral hazard problem is not present in the Islamic banks. The POSTDI coefficients are not statistically 
significant with all the three variables of bank risks ie. NPLASSET, ZSCORE and OVERHEADTA. 
 
Table 5 - Regression Results: Effects of the Introduction of Deposit Insurance on the Bank Risk Taking by 
Conventional Banks 
 
Conventional banks Dependant variable (Expected sign with POSTDI) 
NPLASSET (+) ZSCORE (-) OVERHEADTA (+) 















































NPLASSET   -0.026* 
(0.013) 
Time dummies (years) Yes Yes Yes 


































N 174 176 175 
 
 
This table presents the results from the two-step System Generalized Method of Moments estimations using 
STATA. The coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses). The Wald, Sargan and Arellano-Bond tests are the post-
estimation test to check the appropriateness of the model (in parentheses is the p-value). Please note that “Adjusted 
values” under Sargan test are based on re-running the regression with combined lag instrumental variable method 
suggested by Roodman(2009). From this table, the System GMM is significant (Wald test) and consistent as there is no 
second order serial correlation and the instruments introduced in the model is acceptable (Sargan test). The estimation 
uses unbalanced annual panel observations of conventional banks in Malaysia over the period 2002-2010.  The 
dependant variable is NPLASSET (the ratio of non-performing loan/financing to bank assets), ZSCORE calculated by 
the author following Boyd et al.(2006) but with two years moving windows and OVERHEADTA (the ratio of overhead 
to total assets).  The independant variable is the dummy variable POSTDI (1=PostDI and 0=otherwise). The rest of the 
variables are controlled for in the model.  *, **and *** indicates significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
Table 6 - Regression Results: Effects of the Introduction of Deposit Insurance on the Bank Risk Taking by 
Islamic Banks 
 
Islamic banks Dependant variable (Expected sign with POSTDI) 
NPLASSET (+) ZSCORE (-) OVERHEADTA 
(+) 


















































Yes Yes Yes 


































N 129 129 129 
 
This table presents the results from the two-step System Generalized Method of Moments estimations using 
STATA. The coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses). The Wald, Sargan and Arellano-Bond tests are the post-
estimation test to check the appropriateness of the model (in parentheses is the p-value).  From this table, the System 
GMM is significant (Wald test) and consistent as there is no second order serial correlation and the instruments 
introduced in the model is acceptable (Sargan test). Please note that “Adjusted values” under Sargan test are based on 
re-running the regression with combined lag instrumental variable method suggested by Roodman(2009).  The 
estimation uses unbalanced annual panel observations of Islamic banks in Malaysia over the period 2002-2010.  The 
dependant variable is NPLASSET (the ratio of non-performing loan/financing to bank assets), ZSCORE calculated by 
the author following Boyd et al.(2006) but with two years moving windows and OVERHEADTA (the ratio of overhead 
to total assets).  The independant variable is the dummy variable POSTDI (1=PostDI and 0=otherwise). The rest of the 
variables are controlled for in the model. *, **and *** indicates significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
One important inference based on the above analysis is that Islamic banks, due to their inherent principles, did not 
experience an increase in moral hazard problem due to increased bank risk in the post-DI period. Although this sounds 
plausible, however, there may be an econometric issue with these results. Roodman (2009) two plausible approach on 
the instrument proliferation problem associated with small datasets provides an excellent solution to overcome this. His 
first approach to arbitrarily choose only a few lags as instrument variables is not feasible in this study as this study 
examines pre-and post-regulation effect. Also, many years in the sample are affected by the financial crisis. Hence, 
Roodman’s second approach is chosen to combine instruments through addition to smaller units. For instance, sharing 
the same dummy variable for the year 2002 and 2003. This solution reduces instrument proliferation problem, however, 
at the cost of not capturing time-varying effects. In this study, the problem is much more severe for Islamic banks 
sample.  
Meanwhile, Sargan Test based p-value also does not change significantly due to such alternation. The p-values 
based on the new adjusted regressions are reported below the actual p-values. For instance, they marginally reduce to 
0.94 in the case of Table 6 reporting Islamic banks results. This leads the author to conclude that the results need to be 
interpreted with caution keeping such instrument proliferation in mind. However, it is important to note that after the 
recent financial crises, Islamic banks have been credited for resilience performance due to the intrinsic strength of the 
Islamic banks. For example, restrictions on the use of leverage and speculation, less exposure to toxic assets such as 
collateralised debt obligations and mortgage-backed securities are explicitly imposed for Islamic banks. Such 
restrictions have the potential to prevent Islamic banks increase in riskiness to new insurance on deposits. In this spirit, 
the study result is in line with Hypothesis 2.  
 
5.3.3 What Can We Learn on the Sensitivity and Magnitude of DI Premium Towards Bank Risk? (Hypothesis 3 
and Hypothesis 4) 
 
The study now focuses on whether the regulation on DI premium is sensitive to bank risk and thereby mitigate the 
moral hazard problem. The primary variable of interest is PREMIUM and PREMIUM*RISKBASED.  This study 
examines the two final hypotheses by comparing the two premium methods, i.e., flat rate versus risk-based method and 





also by estimating the annual premium paid by the banks.  These hypotheses test whether risk-premium sensitivity 
significantly improves using the risk-based premium method as well as whether the magnitude of the annual premium 
paid by the banks is positively correlated with bank risk.  
The annual premium paid, PREMIUM will identify whether the premium is adequate to cover for the increase in 
bank risk. The results reported in Table 7 indicate that the PREMIUM coefficient is not significant with operational 
risk; however, the coefficient is significant at 1 per cent level for NPLTA and ZSCORE.  The PREMIUM coefficient 
under NPLTA is significant and negative while ZSCORE is significant and positive.   Generally, these results report 
that the annual premium has a negative relationship with bank risk. When there is an escalation in risk, the premium is 
inadequate to cover the increase in risk while if there is a reduction in risk, it is adequately covered.  For example, the 
annual premium would decrease by RM1.953 million for an RM1 million increase in bank’s credit risk (Model 10).  On 
the other hand, the annual premium could adequately cover by RM1.953 million for a RM1 million reduction in bank’s 
credit risk.  The PREMIUM variable suggests that when there is a reduction in risk, the banks still pay adequate annual 
premiums.  However, when there is an increase in risk, the annual premium is inadequate to cover the increase in risk.  
Although the results for the relationship between the annual premium and risk are significant, the direction is negative 
or inversely related.  In other words, the current DI premium is not adequate to cover increased bank risk or the DI 
premium reaction and fails to support Hypothesis 4 that the magnitude of the annual premium paid is positively 
associated with the bank risk.   
 
Table 7 - Regression Results: The Risk-Premium Sensitivity and Bank Risk 
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N 160 160 160 
 





This table presents the results from the two-step System Generalized Method of Moments estimations using 
STATA. The coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses). The Wald, Sargan and Arellano-Bond tests are the post-
estimation test to check the appropriateness of the model (in parentheses is the p-value).  From this table, the System 
GMM is significant (Wald test) and consistent as there is no second order serial correlation and the instruments 
introduced in the model is acceptable (Sargan test).  The estimation uses unbalanced annual panel observations of 
conventional banks and Islamic banks in Malaysia over the period 2002-2010.  The dependant variable is NPLASSET 
(the ratio of non-performing loan/financing to bank assets), ZSCORE calculated by the author following Boyd et 
al.(2006) but with two years moving windows and OVERHEADTA (the ratio of overhead to total assets).  The 
independant variables dummy variable RISKBASED (1=risk based premium and 0=flat rate premium) and PREMIUM 
which is calculated with modification by the author based on the MDIC Guidelines.  The rest of the variables are 
controlled for in the model. We use the sample for all banks after the introduction of DI. *, **and *** indicates 
significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
The final variable of interest is PREMIUM*RISKBASED.  The interaction variable PREMIUM*RISKBASED  
will probe whether the risk-premium sensitivity improves in the risk-based DI system.  PREMIUM*RISKBASED 
coefficient is -0.03 and is significant at the 1% level.  The negative coefficient indicates that the risk-based premium is 
inadequate to cover for the increased bank risk since if there is an increase in risk, there would be a drop in the annual 
premium.  The results in Table 7 establish that the risk-premium sensitivity worsens in the risk-based premium 
assessment method as the premium is more inadequate compared to the flat rate DI system.  This suggests that banks 
have the incentives to increase risk (moral hazard problem) in the risk-based DI premium system, as despite incurring 
the higher risk, the premiums paid are lower than their risk profiles.  Indirectly, the results explain why during the 
period of study, there exists a moral hazard problem after the introduction of the DI system in Malaysia.  In this 
instance, the risk-based DI system is an ineffective policy because there is no improvement in the risk-premium 
sensitivity under the risk-based premium compared to the flat-rate premium. The negative coefficient indicates that the 
risk-based premium is inadequate to cover for the increased bank risk. The result is contrary to Hypothesis 3.   
      
5.3.4 What Can We Learn on Bank Risk with Different Ownership and Size?  
 
With respect to the control variables, they show mixed results.  The first control variables bank ownership; 
FOREIGN shows a negative and significant relation with NPLASSET and OVERHEADTA, but a positive and 
significant relation with ZSCORE and OVERHEADTA.  Generally, this asserts that foreign banks are less risky than 
the local banks possibly because their asset portfolio is well diversified across countries.  If too-big to fail guarantees 
exist in the Malaysian banks, one would expect large banks are taking more risk than smaller banks.  However, this 
may not be the case for credit risk and insolvency risk, as shown in Table 4. A clear direction for RWCR could not be 
identified in the study models. The interaction term; PREMIUM*LOG_ASSET reveals that bank size matters in 
determining the annual DI premium paid by the banks. As risk increases in larger banks, these banks also pay adequate 
premium. On the contrary, the premium paid by the smaller banks is less adequate than the larger banks.   
 
5.4 Robustness Checks  
Cognizant of the instrument proliferation problem, time dummy variables are replaced with controls for general 
macroeconomic condition with the inflation rate and real GDP growth rate in all of the regressions.  The results remain 
unchanged.  This study also excludes size from the regression models as it is highly correlated (70%) with the 
estimated annual DI premium paid. This study obtains qualitatively similar results to the main results in Table 7.  
Finally, the study ran the static panel for comparison (result not reported) and corrected the model by running the 
Hausman-Taylor Instrumental Variable regression.  The results are qualitatively similar to those reported in this paper.  
 
6. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
This study comes at an important juncture where it has become imperative for all central banks in the world to 
introduce DI mechanism. The academic literature is divided on the efficacy of DI as a mechanism to mitigate the moral 
hazard problem faced by banks. This study argues that existing studies on the relationship between bank risk and DI 
suffers from identification problem as many unobservable factors, other than, DI, can influence bank risk. It is 
deliberated that a credible risk-based DI system will eventually promote prudent and sound risk management practices 
among the banks. On the contrary, a poorly designed DI system may affect the stability of the banking system. In this 
study, moral hazard is present by way of increased risk-taking in the Malaysian banking system after the 
implementation of DI system.  Following this, there is a significant difference in bank risk-taking between the 
conventional and Islamic banks in Malaysia after the introduction of DI system.  These findings enable policymakers 
and regulators like the Ministry of Finance, Central banks and DI organisations to evaluate whether DI escalates or 
retards risk-taking behaviour by insured banks in addition to whether there is an improvement in the sensitivity of risk-
premium to bank risk. Such an evaluation would enable policymakers and regulators to institute appropriate policy 





measures to counter risk-taking behaviour by banks.   In the following paragraphs, some of these implications are 
discussed.     
 
6.1 Implications for the Policy 
 
Bank Size Matters 
 The implications of this study for policy are to infer that the bank size matters in the annual premiums of the 
deposit insurance paid.  The findings of this study suggest that big banks that have high risk pay adequate premium 
while at the same time, small banks that have high-risk profiles pay inadequate premiums.  The findings of this study 
also offer a rationale on why the big banks are reluctant to participate in a deposit protection scheme if the participation 
is voluntary.  In terms of the policy, the measures for the annual premium should differ between the small and big 
banks.  The current measures for computing the annual premium are inadequate to cover the small banks.  In a bigger 
picture, the small banks should be regulated more stringently.    
 
Implementation of an Early Warning Mechanism 
 Risk-based DI premiums have been adopted by several DI agencies, including the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) and the Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation to mitigate the moral hazard problem.  A credible 
DI system promotes financial stability, thus provides sound and stable environment for bank intermediation to support 
economic growth.  The potential problem of moral hazard requires articulation to design credible DI schemes 
particularly the deposit insurance premiums to rectify the moral hazard problem.  In the case of Malaysia, thus far, 
there is no incidences of bank runs.  Nonetheless, given the reality that the financial crisis is cyclical in nature, it is vital 
to put in place a well-designed DI premium that is risk-premium sensitive as part of the existing financial safety net.  
The ramifications of a financial crisis would impact more severely the small banks than the big banks as the premiums 
are inadequate to cover the small banks.  In a financial crisis, small banks normally fail.  This situation asserts the 
importance to institute an early warning mechanism as part of the early intervention framework for the deposit insurer 
to step in when a bank faces failure.   
 
Cross-Border Cooperation and Information Sharing   
 This study provides new evidence that operational risk-taking increases in post DI period. Major operational losses 
caused by internal or external fraudulent activities or lack of internal controls are often the common source of bank 
failures.  The inclusion of operational risk as one of the pillars in Basel II was in response to the collapse of Barings 
Bank in 1995, which was recognised as the oldest (1762-1995) merchant bank in London. The collapsed was due to the 
lag and lapses in internal control of its personnel (Nick Leeson) and the processes involved.  The collapse of a bank that 
was in operation for more than 200 years took the financial sector players by surprise.   
 Barings suffered irreparable loss of $1.3 billion that was caused by rogue trading activities.  This anecdote 
highlights the fact that conventional banks are constantly exposed to different kinds of operational risk.  Operational 
losses of banks are more often passed on to their customers.  This study resorts to management efficiency as a proxy for 
operational risk to include people as the essence of operational risk.  Although operational risk is commonly perceived 
as firm or bank-specific, the systemic component of its impact is growing in importance as evidenced by the 2007/2008 
global financial crisis.  Specifically, as the relationships among financial institutions in particular, the systematically 
important financial institutions located in different countries increase, operational disruptions are likely to lead to 
increased market volatility and contagion across markets and countries. Hence, this necessitates formal cooperation in 
particular on compensation frameworks and information sharing protocols between DI agencies and supervisory 
authorities in the region to deal more effectively with systemic bank failures.   
 
Ethical Principles of Islamic Finance 
 The findings of this study raise the question on why Islamic banks that also prescribe to the Islamic DIS or a 
Shariah-compliant DIS do not adjust their risk after the introduction of the DI system, unlike the conventional banks. 
This study suggests that compliance with Shariah principles prevent Islamic banks from adjusting their risk post DI.  
Islamic financing amongst others prohibits investment in activities that have uncertainties (gharar) especially related to 
risk, interest (riba) and gambling (maysir) activities.  In other words, these ethical principles are the compelling aspects 
of Islamic banking that could be also applied to conventional banking.  These important ethical fundamentals of Islamic 
finance inadvertently allow the Islamic banks’ resources only to finance real assets rather than financial derivatives.  
On this front, this limits the Islamic banks' exposure to uncalculated risks.  Therefore, Islamic banks do not adjust their 
risk contrary to their conventional counterparts after the introduction of DI system in Malaysia.   
Bank failures may be caused by many other exogenous factors like bad economic environment, political instability 
or non-credible designs of existing DI systems that are more prone to  banking  instabilities. With the above in mind, it 
is suggested that policymakers should carefully consider design features for an effective risk-based DI system that is 
risk-premium sensitive to ensure financial stability.    
 





6.2 Implications for the Literature 
  
Risk-based Deposit Insurance System Not Necessarily Mitigate Moral Hazard Problem 
The findings of this study indirectly evaluate the effectiveness of the risk-based DI system in Malaysia.  It is 
apparent from the empirical evidence that the risk-based system replacing the flat rate system since 2008 is still an 
inferior policy to counter the moral hazard problem.  The objective of regulators to migrate from the flat-rate premium 
to risk-based premium scheme is to prevent banks from increasing their risk-taking.  However, the risk-based DI 
premium will only be effective in replacing the flat-rate premium if the risk-premium sensitivity improves.  On the 
contrary, this is not the case for the Malaysian risk-based DI system.  The moral hazard problem is present in the form 
of increased bank risk after the introduction of the DI system because the premium is inadequate to cover the risk.  In 
general, the findings do offer an insight to regulators that migrating from the flat rate to risk-based premium may not 
necessarily mitigate the moral hazard problem unless the premium coverage adequately covers the increase in bank 
risk. 
 
Significant Difference in Bank Risk between the Islamic Banks and Conventional Banks Post Deposit Insurance 
 The introduction of DI system does not alter the risk exposure of the Islamic banks, as there is no change in the 
Islamic banks risk-taking.  Only the conventional banks alter their risk profiles after the introduction of DI system.  The 
conventional banks’ objectives have always been seen as seeking higher profits and their bottom-line considerations.  
High-risk investments will generate higher profits.  Thus, the DI protection provides a protective buffer for the 
conventional banks to embark on risky investments as the deposit protection will partly cover their downside risks.  On 
the other hand, the Shariah principles guided the Islamic banks to create value in their investments. Therefore, the 
Islamic banks will only consider a calculated risky investment that adds value not only to the borrower but also to the 
real economy. 
 
Inadequate Risk-based Premium Provides Opportunity for Arbitrage 
 The risk-based DI system in Malaysia during this study period allows regulatory arbitrage for the small 
conventional banks.  The first part of the empirical study indicates that only the conventional banks increased their risk-
taking after the introduction of DI system.  As such, the regulatory arbitrage is enjoyed only by the small conventional 
banks. If a small conventional bank increases risk, the bank only pays a low premium which is inadequate to 
commensurate with the increase in risk.   
 
In conclusion, despite arguments forwarded especially by the efficient market school that deposit insurance system may 
not function as an effective safety net to prevent financial crisis; like the 2007/2008 global financial crisis, it could be 
concluded that deposit insurance is here to stay. Deposit insurance cannot prevent financial instability but it could 
buffer and insulate risks to minimise the effects.  If financial instability other than bank runs causes bank failures, then 
to conclude that the deposit insurance system is ineffective is not correct.  Elsewhere, this study suggests that the 
ethical financing under Shariah principles guide the operating principles for the Islamic banks and restrict the 
incentives for riskier businesses prohibited by the Shariah. However, it is important to note that this study results may 
suffer from small sample problem and proliferation of instrumental variables. Hence, this study does not draw any 
strong conclusions on Islamic banks risk-taking under a DI system. Future research can focus on addressing this issue 
for more meaningful policy and literature implications. 
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